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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu Center”) 
is a non-profit organization based at the Seattle University School of Law.  The 
Korematsu Center works to advance justice through research, advocacy, and 
education.  Inspired by the legacy of Fred Korematsu, who defied military orders 
during World War II that ultimately led to the unlawful incarceration of 110,000 
Japanese Americans, the Korematsu Center works to advance social justice for all.  
The Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or otherwise, represent the official 
views of Seattle University. 
The Korematsu Center has a special interest in addressing government 
action targeted at classes of persons based on race, nationality, or religion.  
Drawing on its experience and expertise, the Korematsu Center seeks to ensure that 
courts understand the historical—and, at times, profoundly unjust—underpinnings 
of arguments asserted to support the exercise of such unchecked executive power. 
Jay Hirabayashi, Holly Yasui, and Karen Korematsu are children of three 
Japanese Americans who challenged the government’s racial curfew and detention 
programs in the United States Supreme Court during World War II: Gordon 
Hirabayashi (see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)); Minoru Yasui 
(see Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943)); and Fred Korematsu (see 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).  Their interest is in reminding 
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this court of the legacy those judicial decisions had on their generation and will 
have on future generations, and the impact of judicial decisions that fail to protect 
men, women, and children belonging to disfavored groups in the name of national 
security.  Guilt, loyalty, and threat are individual attributes.  When these attributes 
are imputed to racial, religious, or national origin groups, courts play a crucial role 
in ensuring that there is a legitimate basis.  Disaster has occurred when courts have 
refused to play this role.   
During World War II, Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred 
Korematsu stood largely alone.  Here, their children are gratified to have such a 
broad coalition standing with them, and together, standing with those communities 
and individuals most directly harmed by the Executive Order:  
Asian Americans Advancing Justice (“Advancing Justice”) is the national 
affiliation of five nonprofit, nonpartisan civil rights organizations: Asian 
Americans Advancing Justice – AAJC, Asian Americans Advancing Justice – 
Asian Law Caucus, Asian Americans Advancing Justice – Atlanta, Asian 
Americans Advancing Justice – Chicago, and Asian Americans Advancing Justice 
– Los Angeles.  Members of Advancing Justice routinely file amicus curiae briefs 
in cases in the federal courts.  Through direct services, impact litigation, policy 
advocacy, leadership development, and capacity building, the Advancing Justice 
affiliates advocate for marginalized members of the Asian American, Native 
3 
 
Hawaiian, Pacific Islander and other underserved communities, including 
immigrant members of those communities. 
The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (“AALDEF”), 
founded in 1974, is a national organization that protects and promotes the civil 
rights of Asian Americans.  By combining litigation, advocacy, education, and 
organizing, AALDEF works with Asian American communities across the country 
to secure human rights for all.  The President’s Executive Order, which would 
curtail the rights of immigrants to be free from discrimination because of their 
national origin, raises issues central to AALDEF’s mission.  In 1982, AALDEF 
testified before the U.S. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
Civilians, in support of reparations for Japanese Americans forcibly relocated and 
imprisoned in camps during World War II.  After 9/11, AALDEF represented more 
than 800 individuals from Muslim-majority countries who were called in to report 
to immigration authorities under the Special Registration (“NSEERS”) program.  
AALDEF is currently providing community education and legal counseling to 
Asian Americans affected by the challenged Executive Order. 
The Hispanic National Bar Association (“HNBA”) is comprised of 
thousands of Latino lawyers, law professors, law students, legal professionals, state 
and federal judges, legislators, and bar affiliates across the country.  The HNBA 
supports Hispanic legal professionals and is committed to advocacy on issues of 
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importance to the 53 million people of Hispanic heritage living in the United 
States.  The HNBA regularly participates as amicus curiae in cases concerning 
immigration and the protection of refugees. 
The Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaii, Honolulu Chapter 
(“JACL Honolulu”) is a non-profit corporation under Section 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code based in Honolulu, Hawaii.  JACL Honolulu draws upon 
Hawaii’s rich, multi-ethnic society and strong cultural values, with a particular 
focus on discrimination and intolerance towards all people victimized by injustice 
and prejudice.  JACL Honolulu has supported redress for Japanese Americans 
incarcerated unfairly under Executive Order 9066, in addition to working on and 
sponsoring annual events to commemorate and educate the public regarding the 
incarceration and Executive Order 9066 as well as the suffering and injustice that 
stemmed from these wrongful actions.  The President’s new Executive Order 
concerning immigration and refugee admissions discriminates based on national 
origin and is reminiscent of Executive Order 9066 that paved the way for the mass 
incarceration of thousands of Japanese Americans.  The history of Japanese 
Americans and Executive Order 9066 closely parallels current actions targeting 
Muslims under the President’s new Executive Order.  This injustice is one of the 
core reasons for the founding of the JACL Honolulu chapter. 
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LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Inc. (“LatinoJustice”) is a national not-for-profit 
civil rights legal defense fund that has defended the constitutional rights and equal 
protection of all Latinos under the law.  LatinoJustice’s continuing mission is to 
promote the civic participation of the greater pan-Latino community in the United 
States, to cultivate Latino community leaders, and to engage in and support law 
reform litigation across the country addressing criminal justice, education, 
employment, fair housing, immigrants’ rights, language rights, redistricting, and 
voting rights.  During its 45-year history, LatinoJustice has litigated numerous 
cases in both state and federal courts challenging multiple forms of racial 
discrimination by government actors including law enforcement practices that 
illegally target racial groups based upon their race, national origin and immigration 
status.  
The National Bar Association (“NBA”) is the largest and oldest association 
of predominantly African-American attorneys and judges in the United States.  The 
NBA was founded in 1925 when there were only 1,000 African-American 
attorneys in the entire country and when other national bar associations, such as the 
American Bar Association, did not admit African-American attorneys.  Throughout 
its history, the NBA consistently has advocated on behalf of African Americans 
and other minority populations regarding issues affecting the legal profession.  The 
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NBA represents approximately 66,000 lawyers, judges, law professors, and law 
students, and it has over eighty affiliate chapters throughout the world. 
The South Asian Bar Association of North America (“SABA”) is the 
umbrella organization for 26 regional bar associations in North America 
representing the interests of over 6,000 attorneys of South Asian descent.  SABA 
provides a vital link for the South Asian community to the law and the legal 
system.  Within the United States, SABA takes an active interest in the legal rights 
of South Asian and other minority communities. Members of SABA include 
immigration lawyers and others who represent persons that have been and will be 
affected by the Executive Order.1 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
History has taught us the risk of everlasting stains to this Nation’s 
constitutional fabric when the Judiciary turns a blind eye to broad-scale 
governmental actions targeting particular racial, ethnic, or religious groups.  In 
light of that history, this court must not abdicate its constitutional duty to critically 
review Executive Order No. 13780, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
                                           
1 Amici hereby certify that no party’s counsel authored the brief in whole or 
in part, no party or party’s counsel contributed money intended to fund preparation 
or submission of this brief, and no person other than amici and their counsel 
contributed money intended to fund preparation or submission of the brief.  The 
parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 
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Entry into the United States,” 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (“Executive 
Order”).   
The Executive Order replaces Executive Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 
8977 (Jan. 27, 2017), which was enjoined by several courts, including the Western 
District of Washington in an order affirmed by this court.  See Washington v. 
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th  Cir. 2017).  The full Ninth Circuit declined to review 
that decision en banc.  See Order Denying Rehearing En Banc, State of Wash. v. 
Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2016).  On the same day this court 
declined to reconsider its decision on the prior Executive Order, the new Order was 
enjoined in part by the District of Hawaii and the District of Maryland.  See Order 
Granting Temporary Restraining Order, Hawaii v. Trump, 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 
(D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2017), ECF No. 219; Mem. Op., Int’l Refugee Assistance Proj. 
v. Trump, 17-cv-00361-TDC (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2017), ECF No. 149. 
In defending the prior Order before this court, the federal government 
argued that the President has “unreviewable authority” to suspend the admission of 
“any class of aliens,” regardless of the constitutional rights and protections 
implicated by his action.  Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1161; see also 
Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3 for Administrative Stay and Motion 
for Stay Pending Appeal at 2, Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 
2017).  For that sweeping contention, the government invoked the so-called 
8 
 
“plenary power” doctrine—a doctrine whose limited role in modern American 
jurisprudence cannot bear the weight of the government’s arguments.   
The plenary power doctrine derives from decisions such as Chae Chan Ping 
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (“Chinese Exclusion Case”), which were 
premised on racist and nativist precepts we now reject.  In upholding a law that 
prohibited Chinese laborers from returning to the United States, the Chinese 
Exclusion Case relied on pejorative stereotypes to eschew judicial scrutiny.  
Hearkening back to dissents from early cases, and informed by contemporary 
norms and the lessons of history, modern courts have refused to afford complete 
deference to executive and legislative decisions in the realm of immigration.   
To that end, in reviewing the prior Order, this court emphatically rejected 
the federal government’s contention that the President’s authority to “suspend any 
class of aliens” is “unreviewable,” explaining that the proposition finds no support 
in precedent and “runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our 
. . . democracy.”  847 F.3d at 1161.  Moreover, this court admonished, judicial 
review is acutely important—and unbounded plenary power is particularly 
untenable—where, as here, the governmental action being challenged promulgates 
a broadly-applicable policy targeting groups based on characteristics such as race, 
religion, or national origin.  See id. at 1162.   
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Defending the new Order, the government has changed its words but not its 
message.  While it no longer invokes the notion of “plenary power,” the 
government nonetheless asks for near complete deference to the Executive Branch 
with respect to the decisions underlying the Order, noting that, “in prescribing 
general policies” particularly in the realm of immigration and national security, 
“the political branches’ . . . constitutional prerogatives are at their zenith.”  Brief 
for Appellants at 40, Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-15589 (9th Cir. 2017); see also id. 
at 32 (arguing that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine of “consular 
nonreviewability”). 
Executive action, taken in the name of national security and left unchecked 
by the judiciary, is all too familiar to the Korematsu Center, which owes its 
existence to the forced relocation and incarceration during World War II of more 
than 110,000 men, women, and children of Japanese descent that was challenged—
to no avail—in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  Decades later, 
upon finally vacating Mr. Korematsu’s conviction for defying the baseless military 
order, a federal court observed that the Korematsu precedent “stands as a constant 
caution that in times of war or declared military necessity our institutions must be 
vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees”; “national security must not be 
used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and accountability”; and 
courts “must be prepared to exercise their authority to protect all citizens from the 
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petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused.”  Korematsu v. United States, 
584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).   
That caution must be heeded here, and the new Executive Order must be 
subjected to the same close judicial scrutiny this court imposed on the prior Order. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE “PLENARY POWER” DOCTRINE ORIGINATED FROM 
RACIST NOTIONS THAT COURTS NOW REJECT. 
1.  To the extent the Supreme Court ever recognized a truly “plenary” 
power in the immigration realm that would preclude judicial review of any 
constitutional claims (which it has not), that conception is linked to racist attitudes 
from a past era and has long since fallen out of favor.  
In the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court upheld a statute preventing the 
return of Chinese laborers who had departed the United States prior to its passage.  
130 U.S. at 581-582.  Describing the reasons underlying the law’s enactment, the 
Court characterized Chinese laborers as “content with the simplest fare, such as 
would not suffice for our laborers and artisans,” and observed that they remained 
“strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves[,] . . . adhering to the customs 
and usages of their own country,” and unable “to assimilate with our people.”  Id. 
at 595.  “The differences of race added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.”  
Id.  Residents of the West coast, the Court explained, warned of an “Oriental 
invasion” and “saw or believed they saw . . . great danger that at no distant day [the 
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West] would be overrun by them, unless prompt action was taken to restrict their 
immigration.”  Id.   
Far from applying a skeptical eye to the law in light of the clear animus 
motivating its passage, the Court found that “[i]f the government of the United 
States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a 
different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its 
peace and security . . . its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.”  Id. at 
606; see also Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion 
Cases: The Plenary Power Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 
ASIAN AM. L. J. 13, 15 (2003).  In reality, the “right of self-preservation” that the 
Court validated as justification for the government’s unbounded power to exclude 
immigrants was ethnic and racial self-preservation, not the preservation of borders 
or national security.  130 U.S. at 608; see id. at 606 (“It matters not in what 
form . . . aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation 
acting in its national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon 
us.”).  Similar racist and xenophobic attitudes are evident in decisions following 
the Chinese Exclusion Case.  See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 
698, 729-730 (1893) (upholding requirement that Chinese resident aliens offer “at 
least one credible white witness” in order to remain in the country); id. at 730 
(noting Congress’s belief that testimony from Chinese witnesses could not be 
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credited because of “the loose notions entertained by the witnesses of the 
obligation of an oath” (quoting Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 598)).  
2. While the Court’s early plenary power decisions were undoubtedly 
influenced by such attitudes now repudiated, the Court nonetheless recognized that 
the government’s sovereign authority is subject to constitutional limitations.  See 
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604 (“[S]overeign powers[] [are] restricted in 
their exercise only by the constitution itself and considerations of public policy and 
justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations.”).  And 
even in those early years, the Court divided over the reach of the government’s 
plenary power in light of those limitations.  Fong Yue Ting, which upheld a law 
requiring Chinese laborers residing in the United States to obtain a special 
certificate of residence to avoid deportation, generated three dissenting opinions.  
See 149 U.S. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“I deny that there is any arbitrary and 
unrestrained power to banish residents, even resident aliens.”); id. at 744 (Field, J., 
dissenting); id. at 762 (Fuller, J., dissenting) (similar).  Even Justice Field, who 
authored the Court’s opinion in the Chinese Exclusion Case, sought to limit the 
plenary power doctrine’s application with regard to alien residents:  
As men having our common humanity, they are protected by all the 
guaranties of the constitution. To hold that they are subject to any 
different law, or are less protected in any particular, than other 
persons, is, in my judgment, to ignore the teachings of our history, the 
practice of our government, and the language of our constitution. 
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Id. at 754 (Fields, J., dissenting). 
Nearly 60 years later, judicial skepticism regarding an unrestrained plenary 
power persisted—and grew.  Dissenting in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 
580 (1952), which upheld a provision permitting the deportation of resident aliens 
who were members of the Communist Party, Justice Douglas quoted Justice 
Brewer’s dissent in Fong Yue Ting, observing that it “grows in power with the 
passing years”: 
This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite 
and dangerous . . . . The governments of other nations have elastic 
powers. Ours are fixed and bounded by a written constitution. The 
expulsion of a race may be within the inherent powers of a despotism.  
History, before the adoption of this constitution, was not destitute of 
examples of the exercise of such a power; and its framers were 
familiar with history, and wisely, as it seems to me, they gave to this 
government no general power to banish. 
Id. at 599-600 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 737-
738 (Brewer, J., dissenting)), (emphasis added).   
In another McCarthy-era precedent, four Justices advocated for limitations 
on the plenary power doctrine.  In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 
U.S. 206 (1953), the Court rejected any constitutional challenge to the exclusion of 
an alien who had previously resided in the United States, despite his resulting 
detention at Ellis Island.  In dissent, Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, 
reasoned that “[n]o society is free where government makes one person’s liberty 
depend upon the arbitrary will of another.”  Id. at 217.  “Dictatorships,” he 
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observed, “have done this since time immemorial.  They do now.”  Id.  Justice 
Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, added that, while in his view the “detention 
of an alien would not be inconsistent with substantive due process,” such 
individuals must be “accorded procedural due process of law.”  Id. at 224. 
3. Perhaps reflective of the shift away from race-based characterizations 
and other outdated notions prevalent in its early plenary power precedents, the 
Court in recent years has been more willing to enforce constitutional limitations on 
the federal government’s authority over immigration matters.   
For example, in Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), the Court held that, 
despite the broad power of the political branches over immigration, INS 
regulations must at least “rationally advanc[e] some legitimate governmental 
purpose.”  Id. at 306.  In Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), the Court 
affirmed that a resident alien returning from a brief trip abroad must be afforded 
due process in an exclusion proceeding, notwithstanding the government’s 
expansive discretion to exclude.  Id. at 33.  And in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
678 (2001), in response to the government’s contention that “Congress has 
‘plenary power’ to create immigration law, and . . .  the Judicial Branch must defer 
to Executive and Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area,” the Court 
observed that such “power is subject to important constitutional limitations.”  Id. at 
695 (citations omitted).  “[F]ocus[ing] upon those limitations,” id., the Court 
15 
 
determined that the indefinite detention of aliens deemed removable would raise 
“serious constitutional concerns” and accordingly construed the statute at issue to 
avoid those problems, id. at 682; see also Washington, 847 F.3d at 1162-1163 
(collecting cases demonstrating reviewability of federal government action in 
immigration and national security matters).  
Indeed, even decisions on which the federal government relies to defend the 
Executive Order do not support the notion that the authority of the political 
branches is plenary and unreviewable in the present context.  The Court’s most 
recent decision in this area in fact suggests that, after more than a century of 
erosion, the plenary power doctrine as the federal government conceives it no 
longer exists.   
In Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), the Supreme Court considered a due 
process claim arising from the denial without adequate explanation of a spouse’s 
visa application.  Although it described the power of the political branches over 
immigration as “plenary,” Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Din makes 
clear that courts may review an exercise of that power to ensure that the reason 
offered for the exclusion of an alien is “legitimate and bona fide.”  Id. at 2139-
2140.  Justice Kennedy explained that, although the Court in Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), had declined to balance the constitutional rights of 
American citizens injured by a visa denial against “Congress’s ‘plenary power to 
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make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those 
characteristics which Congress has forbidden,’” Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 (quoting 
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766), the Court did inquire “whether the Government had 
provided a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide’ reason for its action,” id. at 2140 
(quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770).  And while as a general matter courts are 
instructed not to “look behind” the government’s asserted reason for its decision 
provided it is “bona fide and legitimate,” Justice Kennedy stated that exceptions to 
that rule would apply if the challenger made “an affirmative showing of bad faith.”  
Id. at 2141.   
To be sure, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Din acknowledged that the 
political branches are entitled to wide latitude and deference in immigration 
matters.  But, as this court recognized when reviewing the prior Executive Order, 
Din (and Mandel before it) concerned an individual visa denial on the facts of that 
case.  By contrast, the Executive Order sets a nationwide immigration policy, 
presumptively suspending entry and foreclosing visa adjudications for most aliens 
of certain nationalities.  While it may be sensible for courts to defer to the 
judgment of the political branches when considering the application of 
immigration law to a particular alien, “the President’s promulgation of a sweeping 
immigration policy,” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1162—especially one aimed at 
nationals of particular countries likely to share a common religion—is properly the 
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subject of closer judicial scrutiny.  Recognizing that critical distinction, this court 
correctly determined that the standard cited in Din plainly does not apply to the 
Executive Order.  Id. 
All told, the proposition that courts should not closely review the Executive 
Order is unsupported by modern judicial precedent.  Even in cases concerning 
individual visa denials, the Court has inquired as to whether the government 
offered a “legitimate and bona fide” reason for the denial and has indicated that 
courts may look behind the asserted rationale in circumstances suggesting bad 
faith.  Where, as here, the court is asked to review a broadly-applicable policy—
promulgated at the highest level of the Executive Branch and targeting aliens based 
on nationality and religion—precedent and common sense demand a more 
searching judicial review.  But whatever the standard, there is no basis for finding 
that the Executive Order is immune from judicial scrutiny. 
II. KOREMATSU STANDS AS A STARK REMINDER OF THE NEED 
FOR VIGILANT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL 
ACTION TARGETING DISFAVORED GROUPS IN THE NAME OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY. 
In telling this court first that the President’s discretion to exclude “any class 
of aliens” is plenary and unreviewable, and now that presidential decision-making 
in that realm is subject to little more than nominal judicial scrutiny, the federal 
government has asked the court to take it at its word that the Executive Order is 
justified by national security.  But the notion that the political branches might use 
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national security as a smokescreen to discriminate against disfavored classes is not 
an unfounded concern—it is validated by the tragic chapter in our Nation’s history 
that gave rise to Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).   
Seventy-five years ago, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 
9066, which authorized the Secretary of War to designate military areas from 
which “any or all persons” could be excluded and “with respect to which, the right 
of any person to enter, remain in, or leave” would be subject to “whatever 
restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may 
impose.”  Executive Order No. 9066, “Authorizing the Secretary of War to 
Prescribe Military Areas,” 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).  Although it did not 
explicitly refer to Japanese Americans, that Order resulted in the forcible 
relocation and incarceration of more than 110,000 men, women, and children of 
Japanese descent.  Fred Korematsu, one of those Japanese Americans, was 
convicted for defying the military’s invocation of the Order.  The Supreme Court 
upheld his conviction, along with the convictions of Gordon Hirabayashi and 
Minoru Yasui, thus effectively sanctioning Japanese-American incarceration 
during World War II on the purported basis of military necessity.  Korematsu, 323 
U.S. 214; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943). 
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The Court’s decision in Korematsu produced vigorous dissents, including 
one by Justice Murphy, who questioned the validity of the military interest the 
government advanced.  Although acknowledging that the discretion of those 
entrusted with national security matters “must, as a matter of . . . common sense, 
be wide,” Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234, Justice Murphy opined that “[i]t is essential 
that there be definite limits to military discretion” and that individuals not be “left 
impoverished of their constitutional rights on a plea of military necessity that has 
neither substance nor support.”  Id.  In his view, the Order “clearly d[id] not meet 
th[is] test” as it relied “for its reasonableness upon the assumption that all persons 
of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous tendency to commit sabotage and 
espionage.”  Id. at 235.  While conceding that “there were some disloyal persons of 
Japanese descent on the Pacific Coast,” Justice Murphy dismissed the “infer[ence] 
that examples of individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty and justify 
discriminatory action against the entire group” as nothing more than “th[e] 
legalization of racism.”  Id. at 240-241, 242.   
History has proven Justice Murphy right.  More than a half-century after the 
Court’s decision, the Acting Solicitor General acknowledged that, contrary to its 
representations, the federal government knew at the time of the mass incarcerations 
that only “a small percentage of Japanese Americans posed a potential security 
threat, and that the most dangerous were already known or in custody.”  U.S. Dep’t 
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of Justice, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the 
Japanese-American Internment Cases (May 20, 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals-mistakes-
during-japanese-american-internment-cases; see also Neal K. Katyal, The Solicitor 
General and Confession of Error, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3027 (2013).  The federal 
government’s revelation occurred decades after a district court reversed Mr. 
Korematsu’s conviction and found “substantial support in the record that the 
government deliberately omitted relevant information and provided misleading 
information in papers before the court.”  Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.  The 
Ninth Circuit made similar findings on its way to vacating Gordon Hirabayashi’s 
convictions.  See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(observing that, although the Supreme Court accepted the government’s contention 
that “the curfew was justified by military assessments of emergency conditions,” 
available materials demonstrate that “there could have been no reasonable military 
assessment of an emergency at the time, that the orders were based upon racial 
stereotypes, and that the orders caused needless suffering and shame for thousands 
of American citizens”) (footnotes omitted); accord Yasui v. United States, 772 
F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985) (vacating Minoru Yasui’s criminal conviction). 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Korematsu gave virtually a blank check to 
the Executive Branch to take action against disfavored minorities in the name of 
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national security.  Although the government asserted a facially valid justification 
for its action, that justification was later discredited.  The revelation that the 
government’s unprecedented action was not in fact necessary is but one reason that 
Korematsu is not only widely understood as wrongly decided as a matter of law, 
but remains a black mark on our Nation’s history and serves as a stark reminder of 
the dire consequences that result when abuses by the political branches go 
unchecked by the Judiciary.  See STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD 
84 (2015) (“Korematsu illustrated that it can be highly destructive of civil liberties 
to understand the Constitution as giving the President a blank check.  Such 
deference could prove even more destructive of rights during a ‘war’ against more 
diffuse security threats over longer periods of time.”); see also ERIC K. YAMAMOTO 
ET AL, RACE RIGHTS AND REPARATIONS: LAW AND THE JAPANESE INTERNMENT 379-
419 (2013); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Symposium: The Changing Laws of War: Do 
We Need A New Legal Regime After September 11?: The Constitution of Necessity, 
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2004) (Complete “judicial acquiescence or 
abdication” of performing checks on Presidential power “has a name.  That name 
is Korematsu”). 
Korematsu, along with Plessy v. Ferguson, is regarded as “embod[ying] a 
set of propositions that all legitimate constitutional decisions must be prepared to 
refute.”  Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011).  
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History may look similarly at this period if courts allow the Executive Order to 
evade robust review based on a plenary power doctrine rooted in outdated notions 
and xenophobia, or an unwillingness to apply healthy judicial skepticism to 
governmental action taken in the name of national security.  This court should not 
abdicate its duty to once again stand as a bulwark against governmental action that 
undermines our core constitutional principles. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this court should deny the relief sought by 
appellants. 
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